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RECENT CASES RESTRICTING THE
AVAILABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT TAX
CREDIT TO NONCORPORATE
LESSORS AND TAX PLANNING
IN THE AFTERMATH
Two recent Tax Court decisions, Peterson v. Commissioner and
Hokanson v. Commissioner, have severely restricted the availa-
bility of the investment tax credit to noncorporate lessors. To
qualify for the credi the term of the lease must be less than fifty
percent of the property's useful life. In determining whether this
provision was satisfied, the Tax Court-for the first time--applied
the "reasonable certainty" and "realistic contemplation" tests.
This Comment concludes that only the "reasonable certainty" test
is consistent with the congressional intent underlying the
noncorporate-lessor restrictions and suggests various devices for
securing the credit on an individual level.
INTRODUCTION
The investment tax credit, reestablished by Congress in 1971,1
is intended to encourage greater investment in business equip-
ment and facilities through a reduction in taxes.2 Generally, a
purchaser or a corporate lessor of "section 38 property" can claim
the credit.3 Section 38 property consists of depreciable realty-
excluding buildings and their structural components-that is em-
ployed in certain activities, and depreciable tangible personalty.4
Additional restrictions to qualifying for the credit, embodied in
LR.C. section 46(e)(3),5 are placed on noncorporate lessors be-
cause Congress was concerned about "the extent to which indi-
1. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497.
2. HR. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1825, 1826; S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1971 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1918-19 [hereinafter cited as HR. REP. and S. REP.].
3. I.R.C. § 38 (1976).
4. LR.C. § 48(a) (1) (A)-(B) (1976).
5. LR.C. § 46(e) (3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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viduals (singly or as a group in a joint venture) were able to
utilize the tax benefits of leasing transactions (the credit and the
depreciation and interest deductions) as a means to shelter from
tax a substantial part of their other income." 6 One of 46(e) (3)'s
provisions requires that the term of the lease must be less than
fifty percent of.the property's useful life. 7 Two Tax Court memo-
randum cases decided in 1982,8 threaten to severely restrict the
availability of the credit to noncorporate lessors by making satis-
faction of the fifty-percent test more difficult. As a result, reevalu-
ation and reformulation of tax-planning strategy is needed. This
Comment analyzes these cases and concludes that only one of
these decisions is consistent with congressional intent. The Com-
ment also suggests various devices for securing the credit on an
individual level.
Qualifying for the Investment Tax Credit
Ordinarily, the amount of credit that can be claimed by the tax-
payer will be ten percent of his qualified investment in the prop-
erty.9 The qualified investment equals the sum of "(a) the
applicable percentage of the basis of each new section 38 property
... placed in service by the taxpayer during such taxable year,
plus (b) the applicable percentage of the cost of each used sec-
tion 38 property.., placed in service by the taxpayer during such
6. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 29; S. REP., supra note 2, at 43.
7. LR.C. § 46(e)(3)(B) (1976).
8. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 674 (1982); Hokanson v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 550 (1982). The precedential value of Tax Court mem-
orandum decisions, which are not reviewed by the entire court, is unclear. Some
commentators have asserted that these decisions contain little or no precedential
value because they usually deal with well-settled legal issues, issues of little im-
portance, or factual determinations. D. ARGUE & L KErn, TAx CoUr PRACTICE 29,
100 (5th ed. 1976); COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, WHEN You Go To THE TAX COURT
4 (1978). Other scholars claim that memorandum cases involve important issues
and possess the same precedential value as reported decisions. See H. BicKFORD,
SuccEssFuL TAX PRAcncE 108 (2d ed. 1952); 1 FED. TAXES (P-H) 29 (1982).
The Golsen rule requires a particular Tax Court tribunal to follow a federal
court of appeals decision only if the decision is "squarely on point" and appeal
from this particular tribunal's decision "lies to that Court of Appeals and to that
court alone." Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970). Branches of the Tax
Court situated in other circuits are not bound by the decision. IC.
9. I.R.C. § 46(a) (2) (A)-(B) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). LR.C. § 48(q) (1), created
by Congress in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 205(a), 96 Stat. 324, 427 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA], requires a reduction
of the property's basis by 50% of the credit taken. Section 48(q) (2) provides that
where the basis has been reduced and recapture must occur, "the basis of such
property (immediately before the event resulting in such recapture), shall be in-
creased by an amount equal to 50 percent of such recapture amount." Id. The al-
ternative provided by § 48(q) (4) (B) (ii) (I)-(l), to elect against the basis reduction
and choose to lower by two percentage points the rate at which the credit is calcu-
lated (Le., 10% to 8%), offers little relief to the taxpayer. Id. at 428.
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taxable year."10 A ceiling on the cost of used property has been
set at $150,000.11 "New section 38 property" is property the origi-
nal use of which begins with the taxpayer, while "used section 38
property" is property that has been placed in service prior to ac-
quisition by the taxpayer."12 The applicable percentage will vary
depending on whether the property is recovery or non-recovery.13
Recovery property is property which is depreciated under the Ac-
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS).14 Generally, any prop-
erty placed into service after 1980 must be depreciated according
to ACRS guidelines.' 5 Non-recovery property is property placed
in service prior to 1981.16
The amount of credit claimed by the taxpayer cannot exceed
his tax liability for the year.17 If the full amount of the credit can-
not be secured in the taxable year, a three year carryback and
fifteen-year carryover of unused credits is permitted.18
If the property is disposed of by the taxpayer before the termi-
nation of its useful life, recapture of a part or all of the credit will
probably occur.19 The amount recaptured will differ, depending
on whether the property is recovery or non-recovery. 20
10. LR.C. § 46(c) (1) (1976).
11. LIC. § 48(c) (2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. LRC. § 48(b)-(c)(1) (1976).
13. LR.C. § 46(c) (2)-(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Except for three-year recovery
property, for which the percentage is 60, the applicable percentage is 100. LR.C.
§ 46(C) (7) (Supp. V 1981). For non-recovery property, the percentage is 100 if the
property's useful life is seven years or more, 66 2/3 if the useful life is five years or
more but less than seven, and 33 1/3 if the useful life is three or more years but
less than five. LR.C. § 46(c) (2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1A LR.C. § 168(a) (Supp. V 1981).
15. I.R.C. § 168(e)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
16. Id.
17. LIC. § 46(a) (3) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The taxpayer can claim the full
amount of the credit up to $25,000, assuming he owes that much in taxes, plus 85%
of his tax liability in excess of $25,000. TEFRA, supra note 9, § 205(b), 96 Stat. at
430.
18. LIC. § 46(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19. LR.C. § 47 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
20. IR.C. § 47(a) (1)-(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For non-recovery property, the
credit is redetermined by substituting the period the property is actually held for
the original useful life selected by the taxpayer. LIC. § 47(a) (1) (1976). The
amount recaptured is then computed by subtracting the redetermined amount
from the originally determined amount of credit. Id For 5-, 10-, and 15-year recov-
ery property, 20% of the credit is recaptured for every year that the property is
owned for less than five taxable years. LRC. § 47(a) (5) (A)-(B) (Supp. V 1981).
For three-year recovery property, 33 1/3% of the credit is recaptured for every
year the property is owned for less than three taxable years. Id.
A lessor of "section 38 property" may elect to pass the credit
through to the lessee with the lessee treated as having acquired
the property.2 1 This alternative will be discussed in greater detail
in the tax-planning section of this Comment.22
Special Requirements for Noncorporate Lessors
Individuals, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations,
which pass the credit directly through to the individual share-
holders, are recognized as noncorporate for purposes of section
46(e)(3).23 Additional restrictions are imposed on noncorporate
lessors to prevent them from entering into leasing agreements as
a device to shelter other income.24 The credit is more valuable if
taken by an individual for two reasons. First, greater tax savings
result because individual tax rates are higher than corporate tax
rates.2 5 Because the tax rate is higher, the taxes the individual
would have had to pay on the amount offset by the credit is
greater. Second, money possessed by a corporation can only be
used for legitimate corporate purposes, but money received on an
individual level can be utilized for almost any purpose the indi-
vidual desires.26
The restrictions of section 46(e) (3) permit a noncorporate les-
sor to qualify for the credit only if.
(A) the property subject to the lease has been manufactured or pro-
duced by the lessor, or
(B) the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less
than 50 percent of the useful life of the property, and for the period
consisting of the first 12 months after the date on which the property
is transferred to the lessee the sum of the deductions with respect to
such property which are allowable to the lessor solely by reason of
section 162 (other than rents and reimbursed amounts with respect
to such property) exceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced
by such property.27
Congress believed that compliance with the manufacturing pro-
vision would indicate that the lease had been entered into as "an
integral part of the taxpayer's business" and not to shelter in-
come.28 Satisfaction of the expense and lease duration tests
would ensure that the "leasing activity constitutes a business ac-
tivity of the taxpayer, rather than a mere investment, i.e., a financ-
21. LR.C. § 48(d) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
22. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text
23. IRC. § 46(e) (3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text
25. Dostart, Current Developments Regarding Investment Tax Credit Availa-
bility to Non-Corporate Lessors, 58 TAXES 561, 562 (1980).
26. Id.
27. LR.C. § 46(e) (3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
28. HLR. REP., supra note 2, at 29; S. REP., supra note 2, at 44.
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ing arrangement."29 Because the fifty-percent test requires a
short-term lease, mere financing agreements are prevented be-
cause the lessor retains the risk of his investment over the major-
ity of the property's useful life.30 Upon expiration of the original
lease, the short-term lessor risks not being able to re-lease the
property or being forced to accept less rent because his property
has declined in value.
If these requirements are met, the amount of the credit avail-
able to the noncorporate lessor is subject to the at-risk limita-
tions.31 The at-risk rule provides that if the property is purchased
through financial leverage, only the at-risk portion of the prop-
erty's basis will be considered in determining the qualified invest-
ment.32 The at-risk part is the percentage of the property that is
purchased with borrowed funds for which the purchaser is per-
sonally liable or for which property other than the property
leased is pledged as security.33
INDEFINrrE DURATION OF LEASE
Peterson v. Commissioner34
Barriers to Qualification Imposed by Peterson
Until Peterson v. Commissioner, the fifty-percent test was met
simply by structuring the transaction so that the stated term of
the lease would be less than fifty percent of the property's useful
life.35 In Peterson, the Tax Court looked beyond the form of the
transaction to its substance, deciding for the first time the issue of
whether a lease for a stated term, absent an option to renew, may
be considered "of indefinite duration for purposes of the invest-
ment tax credit."36
In Peterson, a group of doctors practiced medicine in the form
29. Id
30. Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 867, 872 (1981).
31. LR.C. § 46(c) (8) (Supp. V 1981).
32. Id.
33. LR.C. § 465(b) (2) (1976).
34. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 674 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 867, 875 (1981). For recovery
property leased after June 25, 1981, the useful life of the property, for purposes of
the investment credit is the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) midpoint life. STAFF
OF JOINT CoMMrTTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., lST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE ERTA OF 1981, at 95 (Comm. Print 1981).
36. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 677.
of a partnership until 1970. In that year, the doctors organized a
corporation under which they continued to practice, buying stock
in the corporation in proportion to the shares they held in the
partnership. Prior to September 30, 1976, the end of the taxable
year in which the disputed credit was taken, the individual doc-
tors' ownership interests in both organizations remained identi-
cal. The partnership purchased and leased equipment solely to
the corporation, except for some inexpensive pieces of equipment
leased to a hospital where some of these doctors worked. All the
equipment needed by the corporation was leased from the part-
nership. The lease in question, entered into in 1975, was preceded
by two similar leases entered into in 1970 and 1972. In all of the
agreements, the stated term of the lease was less than fifty per-
cent of the property's useful life. Although none of the leases
contained an option to renew, property covered under one lease
was always included in a subsequent lease. In the lease in ques-
tion, the partnership leased a typewriter and computer to the cor-
poration. The typewriter was purchased by the partnership to
replace the corporation's worn-out model, while the computer was
acquired because the corporation had become dissatisfied with
the performance of a computer service bureau. Considerable
time and effort was invested by the business manager of both the
corporation and the partnership in selecting the computer. The
total cost of the equipment, $162,000, included over $3,000 for im-
provements to the premises so the computer could be properly in-
stalled. The property in question was included in a subsequent
lease entered into in 1978. Rent during the 1975 lease was set at
two-and-one-half percent of the cost of the property, but under
the 1978 lease, the property was reappraised and the rent was re-
duced to two percent.3 7
Relying on the "reasonable certainty test" developed in prior
Tax Court cases for determining whether a lessee could amortize
improvements made on leased property over the term of the
lease,38 the court held that the term of the lease did not meet the
fifty-percent test, but was of indefinite duration. The reasonable
certainty test requires a determination of whether the lessee is
reasonably certain to continue leasing the property beyond the
stated term.3 9 If this reasonable certainty is found to exist, the
lease is deemed to be of indefinite duration.
Basing its decision on the presence of several factors, the court
attached the most significance to the motivation behind retaining
37. Id at 674-76.
38. Id. at 677.
39. Id.
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the depreciable assets in the partnership upon incorporation and
having the partnership lease the property solely to the corpora-
tion; no legitimate business purpose, other than securing the tax
benefit, was intended.40 Other factors indicative of indefinite du-
ration were the common control of the lessor and lessee, a history
of continual renewal beyond the stated term, the tailoring of the
lessor's purchases for the lessee's specific needs, and the lessee's
failure to lease from anyone else.41
The rent at which the property could be leased was subject to
change by reappraisal upon expiration of the 1975 lease, but the
court dismissed this as inconsequential.4 The court indicated
that the minimal amount expended on improvements, which
would be lost when the term ended, supported a finding that the
lease term was definite, but was insufficient to offset the weight of
the other factors.43
40. Id. at 678.
41. Id. at 677-78.
42. Id. at 679. A policy of reappraisal would appear to be an indication that the
parties intended the lease to be definite because a decline or increase in the value
of the property might affect the rental rate to an extent that either party might be
unwilling to renew. See Alamo Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 534, 543
(1950) (this applies to the situation where both parties must consent to a renewal
or either party has the right to terminate the lease). In the improvement cases
cited by the court to support its treatment of reappraisal, the courts considered
reappraisal, but found it to be outweighed by other factors showing a reasonable
certainty that the lease would be renewed. See G.W. Von Keppel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1253, 1257 (1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1961); Hens &
Kelly, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 305, 326 (1952) (the fact that the taxpayer had
originally amortized improvements over the lease term and renewal period carried
more weight than the fact of appraisal). Although the same situation applies in
this case, the court neglected to accord it the weight it was due.
43. Peterson v. Commissioner 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 679. Courts in the improve-
ment cases have held that substantial improvements whose useful life would ex-
tend considerably past the stated lease term, and which would revert to the lessor
on expiration of the lease, would not have been made unless the lessee intended
to retain the property for another term. Stennet v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 221, 223
(1970); Morris v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 279, 284-85 (1962). See Hodge v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1564, 1568 (1976) (an inference of indefinite duration
arises when substantial improvements are made near the end of the lease term);
Buddy Schoellkopf Products, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 640, 657 (1975); G.W.
Von Keppel v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1253, 1257. Conversely, if only a
minimal amount of capital is invested in improvements, the loss of this capital on
expiration would not deter the lessee from terminating the leasing arrangement.
The reluctance to make more substantial improvements may indicate an intent
not to renew the lease.
The Reasonable Certainty Test
The reasonable certainty test, first employed in the improve-
ment cases, applies if a noncorporate lessor claims the credit and
agrees to lease property for a stated term. The courts in the im-
provement cases "were concerned with the precise factual issue
[confronting the court in Peterson], whether the stated term of a
lease should be disregarded as being not in reality its actual
term.""
Before assessing the factors which the Peterson court relied
upon in formulating its conclusion, it should be noted that the
court followed the evidentiary rule developed in the improvement
cases 45 and adopted in earlier investment credit cases.46 The
court, in making its determination, will look only to the facts and
circumstances that existed the year the property was placed into
service.47 This rule applies not only to leases with a stated term,
but to leases with no set termination date.4 8
As did the court in Peterson, the courts in the improvements
cases viewed a past history of lease renewal of property as an in-
dication that such a pattern will not end when the lease in ques-
tion terminates. 49 This factor may assume greater importance in
tax credit cases because it tends to show that a particular lessor
will not bear the risks of ownership incumbent upon short-term
lessors generally.
In Peterson, the identical taxpayers controlled the partnership
and corporation.5 0 In the improvement cases, where the lessors
and lessees are related or one of the parties exercises control over
the other, many courts have held that such a relationship "makes
possible the continuation of the ... lease arrangement as long as
it is advantageous."5 ' However, some courts have not afforded
this factor the same degree of weight.52 Despite almost identical
44. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 677.
45. See, e.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 279, 284 (1962).
46. Ridder v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 867, 872-73 (1981); Bloomberg v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 1368, 1372 (1980).
47. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 679.
48. Id.
49. Morris v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. at 285; G.W. Von Keppel v. Commissioner,
19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1257; Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 69, 78 (1958).
50. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCI) at 678-79.
51. Highland Hills Swimming Club, Inc. v. Wiseman, 272 F.2d 1976 (10th Cir.
1959).
52. Joseph N. Neel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1934). "While the
actions of a family corporation or family group should be carefully scrutinized, it is
entirely conceivable that the relations each with the other, or their respective per-
sonalities, may be such that they will deal with each other strictly at arm's length.
It sometimes happens that their very nearness in blood leads them to be more in-
dependent in action than strangers in blood." Id. In this case, a lease, entered
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control of the lessor and lessee corporations, the Tax Court, in
Fort Wharf Ice Co. v. Commissioner,53 found the lease term to be
definite. The court disregarded common control because the cor-
porations were created for legitimate business purposes and func-
tioned as "independent" entities.54
The improvement cases indicate that the significance of com-
mon control depends on two variables: the degree of control and
the conduct of the parties. In Peterson, common control carried
great weight because ownership of both organizations was identi-
cal and although the reasonableness of the rent was not con-
tested, the parties had a prior history of renewing the same
equipment.55
The purchase of the typewriter and computer for the corpora-
tion's specific needs56 tends to show that the property will be
used as long as it satisfies these needs. Unless the equipment is
of such a nature that it may become outmoded or unprofitable
before the expiration of its useful life, or the needs of the lessee
are unstable, the property would probably be employed for its en-
tire useful life. Because the typewriter was purchased to replace
a worn-out model,57 it appears likely the new machine would be
used in the same way. The time and money spent to choose the
computer plus its cost shows that it was bought for long-term
use.58 The probability of renewal becomes even greater when one
into between two corporations owned by the same family, provided for a stated
lease term and two successive options to renew. The court held that the leases
had to be amortized over the term and one option because the reasonable rental
rate appeared to be the result of arm's length negotiations. Id. Similar reasoning
was applied in Letter Ruling 8225001 (1982), in which the IRS declined to deny the
credit to a lessor who owned 100% of the lessee corporation and constructively
owned 41% of the sublessee (a partnership composed of his children owned 59%).
The fact that the rent paid was not less than that which would be charged by unre-
lated lessors illustrated the parties' separate interests. Id. The IRS also relied
heavily on the cancellation of the lease as indicative of such interests. Id. The
court in G.W. Von Keppel distinguished Neel based on the type of relationship;
since the lessor and lessee in Neel were siblings, they possessed a "completely in-
dependent pecuniary interest" as opposed to the interest shared by husband and
wife in G.W. Von Keppel. G.W. Von Keppel v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.ML (CCH) at
1257.
53. 23 T.C. 202 (1954).
54. Id. at 208.
55. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.AM. (CCH) at 678-79.
56. Id. at 677.
57. Id. at 675.
58. IRS Brief at 14, Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 674 (1982) (on
file with San Diego Law Review). The doctor's practice was situated in Sacra-
realizes that if the corporation declined to continue using the
computer, the partnership would have had to enter the market to
dispose of it.
The court cited the tax motive for establishing the leasing oper-
ation as the most important factor in its decision to disallow the
credit.5 9 Instead of disbanding the partnership when the corpora-
tion came into existence and having the corporation purchase the
equipment, the partnership, by purchasing and leasing the prop-
erty to the corporation, was used to capture the credit.60 The plan
was devised so the credit could be claimed by the individual doc-
tors, because a percentage of the total credit would pass directly
to the individual doctor-partners based on their share of the qual-
filed investment.61 The court found that this lack of a business
purpose, other than the intent to secure the tax benefit, was the
clearest indicator of an intent to renew indefinitely.62
The tax motive, at least in Peterson, supports a finding of indefi-
nite duration because it indicates that the lease is a mere financ-
ing agreement. In financing the purchase of equipment, the
doctors wanted to obtain the greatest tax benefits available with
the least effort and risk. This goal, prior to this case, was best re-
alized by having the partnership continually lease the property to
the corporation for terms of less than fifty percent of the prop-
erty's useful life. Recapture of the credit and depreciation did not
occur because the partnership remained the owner of the equip-
ment for its entire useful life. The doctors also avoided the
greater expenditures of time, effort, and money they would have
incurred had they sought to lease property to or from unrelated
parties.
Any of these factors alone in a particular case may be insuffi-
cient for a court to find a reasonable certainty of renewal. If a tax
motive is the sole indication of indefinite duration, a court may
hold the lease term does not exceed the statutory limit. However,
the tax motive may provide an independent basis for denying the
credit.
Tax Motive-Independent Grounds for Denial of the Credit
The tax motive for establishing the leasing arrangement pro-
vides an alternative basis for refusing the credit to the partner-
mento. In deciding which computer to choose, the business manager of both the
corporation and the partnership made trips to Kentucky, Texas and Los Angeles.
59. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.AM. (CCH) at 677.
60. Id. at 678.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(a)(1) (1964).
62. Peterson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 678.
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ship. Even though a transaction is entered into solely to obtain
tax benefits or to avoid taxes, the courts as a general rule will per-
mit the parties to retain the tax advantages derived from the
transaction. 63 However, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished an exception to this rule in Gregory v. Helvering.64 In
Gregory, a corporate reorganization, motivated solely by tax con-
siderations, met the literal requirements of the reorganization
statute. The Court refused to recognize the transaction, declaring
that "the rule which excludes from consideration the motive of
tax avoidance is not pertinent to this situation, because the trans-
action upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To
hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to de-
prive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose."65
The principle announced in Gregory rejects transactions that lack
a legitimate business purpose and which contravene statutory in-
tent because they are motivated solely by tax considerations. 66
However, two recent investment credit cases decided by the
Tax Court suggest that some judges may disregard the parties' in-
tentions and make a determination based on whether the statu-
tory form was observed by the parties. In Hokanson v.
Commissioner,67 the court denied the credit to a lessor who ad-
mittedly was a member of the class Congress had designed the
credit to benefit; he had not leased property to shelter income,
but was using the property in an active business. In refusing the
credit because he did not meet the fifty-percent test, the court
said, "Congress erected two hard and fast tests, neither of which
petitioners meet. We realize petitioners may not be within the
target class. However,... Congress chose an easily administered
approach and sacrificed a degree of equity, and it is not for us to
pass upon the wisdom of legislation."68 In Carson v. Commis-
sioner,69 a case dealing with the manufacture provision of section
46(e) (3), a lessor who possessed valid business reasons was again
63. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468, 470 (1934); Superior Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 280 U.S. 395-96 (1930); Jones v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir.
1934); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
64. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
65. Id.
66. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1960); Boone v. United
States, 470 F.2d 232, 237 (10th Cir. 1972); W.H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188
F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1951).
67. 44 T.C3. (CCH) 550, 553 (1982).
68. Id.
69. 79 T.C. 215 (1982).
denied the credit. Because the provisions of section 46(e) (3) are
unambiguous, the court said that "under these circumstances, the
presence or absence of valid business reasons of petitioner for en-
tering into the leasing transaction in question is wholly
irrelevant."70
However, in the cases just cited the court disregarded the par-
ties' intentions and the legislative history if they failed to meet
the criteria of section 46(e) (3). It is questionable whether the
same judges would disregard these factors if the lessor had satis-
fied the literal requirements of section 46(e) (3). The Gregory
principle must be applied to satisfy congressional intent. Applica-
tion of the principle in Peterson results in denial of the credit.
The doctors were not engaged in an active business; they were
simply sheltering income. Because they lacked a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, they came within the class Congress intended to
prohibit from claiming the credit.71
Hokanson v. Commissioner
Barriers to Qualification Imposed by Hokanson
Nor-Pac, an Oregon corporation engaged in food distribution,
became disenchanted with the transportation service it was re-
ceiving from various commercial organizations. Deciding against
purchasing the necessary equipment, it entered into a lease-em-
ployment agreement with Hokanson in 1970. Under this agree-
ment, Hokanson became the company's transportation director
and leased vehicles to the corporation. Hokanson had to disband
a similar business in Texas. The vehicles for which the disputed
credit was taken were purchased in 1977 and 1978. Hokanson and
Nor-Pac agreed on an open-ended lease that either could termi-
nate after the initial year, and thereafter at the end of each suc-
cessive year by giving thirty days' notice. The lease was reviewed
by the Nor-Pac board of directors at an annual meeting where Ho-
kanson, both orally and in writing, provided a detailed analysis of
the year's trucking operations. The rent was periodically raised.
Hokanson did not receive income from any other sources. 72
To determine whether the lease met the fifty-percent test or
was of indefinite duration, the court employed the test for open-
ended leases in investment tax credit cases. This test requires
70. Id. at 225. See also Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 769 (1978), rev'd 651
F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981) (when the statute is unambiguous on its face, "neither the
legislative history nor the regulations may be used in derogation" of the statutory
language).
71. ILR. REP., supra note 2, at 29; S. REP., supra note 2, at 43-44.
72. Hokanson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.ML (CCH) at 550-51.
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that the lessor and lessee, at the time the lease is entered into,
"realistically contemplate" termination of the lease before the
term of the lease extends past the fifty-percent mark.73 If the test
is not satisfied, the lease term is indefinite. 74 The court found the
test had not been met and cited three factors that indicated the
parties intended to lease the property for its entire useful life.
First, no property subject to the lease had ever been used for less'
than fifty percent of its useful life. Second, the corporation's
switch from commercial firms to Hokanson and Hokanson's termi-
nation of his Texas business indicated "undertakings of a long-
term nature." Finally, the bank which financed Hokanson's truck
purchases followed a policy of not extending a loan beyond the
time a lease could be terminated. In this case, the loan was ex-
tended past the first year. The loan officer testified that it was his
belief that the lease would run indefinitely.75
The Realistically Contemplated Test
This decision appears to rest on the court's interpretation of the
"realistically contemplated" test. In a 1981 investment tax credit
case, Ridder v. Commissioner,76 the Tax Court introduced this
test for open-ended leases. The court gave little insight into what
it meant by "realistically contemplated" because the taxpayer
failed to present any evidence of such contemplation.7 7 What
would satisfy this test was not delineated.
The court in Hokanson construed the test to require the tax-
payer to "give some reason to indicate termination of the lease
was realistically contemplated by the parties" at the time the
lease was entered into.78 'That the parties recognize a distinct
possibility that the lease might be terminated" prior to the fifty-
percent mark would be insufficient to satisfy the test.79
73. Id. at 552.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 552-53.
76. 76 T.C. 867, 875 (1981). The language of § 46(e) (3) (B) states that the
noncorporate lessor can obtain the credit if the "term of the lease. . . is less than
50 percent." A problem originates with open-ended leases because there is no set
term. It would be unfair to deprive these lessors of the credit, because they may
be assuming the same risks as a noncorporate entity who is leasing property for a
closed term.
77. Id.
78. Hokanson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 552.
79. Id.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "contemplate"
as "to view or consider with continued attention; to regard
thoughtfully; to meditate on; to study."8 0 As long as the parties
presented evidence that they actually considered termination
before the fifty-percent mark, the test should be satisifed. This
test does not require that termination be contemplated as a
probability; it appears to require that some mechanism be estab-
lished whereby the lease is examined periodically and if the leas-
ing operation fails to meet certain realistically set criteria, the
parties will not hesitate to cancel the lease. Because the purpose
of the fifty-percent test is to ensure that the lessor retains the risk
of his investment over the majority of the property's useful life,8 '
a "distinct possibility" of termination should be sufficient; the risk
will be present when this possibility exists.
The evidence seems to contradict the court's conclusion that
the parties did not "realistically contemplate" termination, but in-
tended to lease the property for its entire useful life. The parties
were unrelated, Hokanson owned no stock in Nor-Pac, and the
lease was presumably negotiated at arm's length.82 Both parties
had legitimate business reasons for dealing with each other.83 By
discontinuing its relationship with the commercial firms, 84 Nor-
Pac showed it would not hesitate to seek other alternatives if its
transportation needs were not satisfied.
The motivation of Nor-Pac for entering into the open-ended
lease as opposed to a stated-term lease also indicates "realistic
contemplation." Hokanson, who had just disbanded a successful
business in Texas and had no other source of income besides the
rent received from Nor-Pac,8 5 would have desired a lease for a
stated term that satisfied section 46(e) (3) to minimize the risk
that Nor-Pac would cancel. Nor-Pac was a corporation trying to
maximize its profits and had already endured an unprofitable ex-
perience in relation to its transportation needs. Evidence was in-
troduced that Nor-Pac was a "conservative organization, ...
unwilling to commit itself beyond the initial lease year."86 It ap-
pears reasonable to assume that Nor-Pac selected an open-ended
lease because such a lease gave Nor-Pac the option to opt out if it
was not satisifed with the performance of the trucks. A closed-
80. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 574 (W. Nielson 2d ed., 1960).
81. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
82. Hokanson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) at 550.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 550-51.
86. Id. at 552.
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term lease would offer greater economic loss if the leasing ar-
rangement proved to be unprofitable.
Because a legitimate business purpose motivated Nor-Pac to
enter into this particular type of lease, it is less likely that the an-
nual reviews were a sham. Indeed, the court did not find that the
reviews were bogus, but affirmed that the taxpayer had to pro-
vide, orally and in writing, a "detailed analysis" of the transporta-
tion division.87 The purpose of receiving such information
appears obvious: it would allow the board to judge the efficiency
of the operation. These annual meetings logically should be
deemed a foium for "realistic contemplation." Such meetings
would serve little or no purpose unless the board intended to de-
cide whether to continue Nor-Pac's relationship with Hokanson.
The court found significant the history of use beyond the fifty-
percent mark.88 When the "reasonable certainty" test is to be ap-
plied, there is no doubt such a history is important. However,
past practice does not seem relevant to the question of whether
the parties actually contemplated termination. Although every
item leased may have been used beyond the fifty-percent mark,
the parties may have in every instance considered termination.
The court also found persuasive the "long-term nature" of the
parties' undertaking.89 Such a characterization of Nor-Pac's activ-
ities is not totally accurate. Nor-Pac made no investment in the
property, so if the lease was cancelled Nor-Pac would bear no risk
of loss. The corporation was simply compensating someone else
for satisfying its transportation needs. There appears to be no
underlying substantial cost that would discourage Nor-Pac from
ending the lease if it proved unsatisfactory. The dissolution of
Hokanson's Texas business to move to Oregon may raise the in-
ference that Hokanson would not have been willing to attempt
such a move unless he was assured Nor-Pac would continually
lease from him. However, it is also plausible that Hokanson sim-
ply assumed the risk that Nor-Pac would remain satisfied over a
period of time.
Finally, little weight can be given to the loan officer's testimony
that it was his belief the lease would run indefinitely.90 Because a
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id. at 553.
90. Id.
loan officer ordinarily is not trained in the law, he may not con-
sider all the factors a court would in determining the intent of the
parties. The criteria for determining intent may differ among
lending institutions, leading to the result that a loan officer of
another financial institution might have reached an opposite con-
clusion. Unless the loan officer actually heard Hokanson and Nor-
Pac officials say they intended to lease the property indefinitely,
his testimony has slight value.
A decision for the taxpayer is justified by the weight of the evi-
dence: the absence of common control, the reason for entering
into this lease, and the holding of annual meetings. An important
policy reason for such a decision is that Hokanson is a member of
the class Congress was trying to benefit. Hokanson entered into
the lease for legitimate business reasons, not to avoid taxes. The
"leasing activity constituted a business activity of the taxpayer,"
as opposed to a financing arrangement. 91
The court's avowal that a distinct possibility of termination will
not satisfy the test, coupled with the paucity of evidence to sup-
port the holding, indicate the court's actual interpretation of "real-
istic contemplation;" the parties must anticipate termination as a
probability and offer a specific reason for such a belief. Only then
does the decision seem justified. Such an interpretation not only
places an evidentiary burden on the taxpayer that might be im-
possible to fulfill, but it is contrary to congressional intent; in
those situations where a strong possibility exists that the lease
will be terminated within the statutory period, the lessor retains
the risk of his investment over the majority of the property's use-
ful life, but is still denied the credit.
One solution is to discard the "realistically contemplated" test
and apply the "reasonable certainty" test to all leases. The latter
test relies on objective criteria; the former risks the vagaries of a
subjective inquiry. Because a "reasonable certainty" would not
exist if there was a "distinct possibility" of termination before the
fifty-percent mark, the "reasonable certainty" test is more in line
with congressional intent (because a distinct possibility of termi-
nation exists, the lessor retains the risk of his investment).
PLANNING TO QUALIFY FOR THE CREDIT
Satisfaction of the Fifty-Percent Test in the Peterson Setting by
Formulation of a Legitimate Business Purpose
In the Peterson factual setting, the allowance of the credit may
depend on the presence of a legitimate business purpose besides
91. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
[VOL 20: 917, 19831 Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tax avoidance. A corporation's desire to limit its potential liability
by keeping assets outside the corporation would appear to be a
valid business purpose, as long as it did not result in inadequate
capitalization. However, -certain professional corporations, which
are the most frequent participants in the Peterson situation, can-
not, at least in California, rely on this purpose; the liability of
medical and law corporations cannot exceed a ceiling amount, an
amount which the corporation is required to guarantee.9 2 Even if
an ordinary corporation is the party involved, a court might be re-
luctant to accept this purpose as legitimate if the liability insur-
ance procured by the corporation appears adequate to cover any
potential liability.
Certain financing reasons may exist for the corporation to re-
tain assets in a partnership. A bank may wish to look.to the per-
sonal assets of the partners, rather than the corporation's assets
as security for repayment of a loan. The validity of this purpose
is suspect because the corporation's shareholders may be able to
guarantee repayment by pledging their personal assets as
security.
A possible alternative is for several corporations to form a part-
nership-lessor with all the shareholders of the corporations own-
ing proportionate interests in the partnership. In certain
circumstances, the court might find that the partnership serves a
valid purpose by being able to purchase the necessary equipment
more cheaply and efficiently than the corporations could
individually.93
A Successive Lease with an Unrelated Third Party
The fifty-percent test may possibly be met by leasing the prop-
erty in question to an unrelated third party after the original
lessee has used the property for less than fifty percent of its use-
ful life.94 However, this option will only be available under cer-
tain circumstances. Treasury Regulation section 1.46-4(d) (4)
92. 18 H. MARSH, CALuFoRmIA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 121-24 (1977).
For professional corporations not regulated in a manner similar to law and medi-
cal corporations, the general rule of limited liability applies. Id. at 121.
93. Cf. Interior Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 330, 339 (1962). Four corpo-
rations leased rental properties to a partnership which was comprised of the cor-
porations' shareholders. The court found it to be created for a legitimate reason; it
allowed the corporations to reduce the costs they would have incurred if they
would have had to manage their property individually.
94. Dostart, =upra note 25, at 565.
provides: "if a noncorporate lessor enters into two or more suc-
cessive leases with respect to the same or substantially similar
items ... , the terms of the lease shall be aggregated and such
leases shall be considered one lease."95 Uncertainty exists be-
cause the regulation does not specify when the second lease must
be entered into for aggregation to be avoided. If successive leases
are entered into simultaneously or within a year of each other,
the leases would most likely be aggregated. 96 The lessor would
not be retaining the risks of ownership over the predominant por-
tion of the property's useful life, (assuming aggregation resulted
in surpassing the fifty-percent test), but merely financing his
purchase. However, if the second lease was entered into at some
later time during the term of the initial lease, the leases might not
be aggregated because the lessor had retained the risks of owner-
ship for a reasonable period. The closer the inception of the sec-
ond lease is to the end of the initial term, the more willing the
courts would be to refuse aggregation. No aggregation could pos-
sibly occur if the second lease was entered into after the expira-
tion of the first lease.97
This strategy may be impractical or undesirable for many les-
sors to pursue in the Peterson or Hokanson situation. The lessor
may encounter great difficulty in trying to locate a person or or-
ganization that will agree to lease used property at some future
date. A person or organization may be unwilling to enter into
such a lease because the agreement virtually forecloses the possi-
bility of a better deal in the future for the same property. If the
lessor decides to let the initial lease term expire before attempt-
ing to re-lease it, he is confronted with the very risks that he pre-
sumably was trying to avoid; that is, no entity desires to lease it,
or the property has declined in value so that he must accept a re-
duced rent. Another factor militating against re-leasing is that
quite frequently the Peterson factual situation will involve profes-
sional corporations. Doctors and attorneys, for example, may be
reluctant to become involved in a true leasing business.
/
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-4(d) (4) (1964). Since the language of the regulation re-
fers only to "leases," it apparently could be sidestepped by entering into a con-
tract to make a lease at some future date. An initial problem with this solution is
the reluctance of courts to enforce an agreement to make an agreement. See
United States v. Orr Const. Co., 560 F.2d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 1977); Transamerican
Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Union Bank, 426 F.2d 273, 274-75 (9th Cir. 1970). The agree-
ment will be invalidated on the grounds of indefiniteness if the terms of the future
agreement cannot be sufficiently determined. Id. at 274-75; LA. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CoNTRAcTs 400-05 (1963). In addition, since such a tactic, if permitted, would de-
feat congressional intent, the value of this ploy will depend on the court's willing-
ness to look beyond the form of the transaction to its substance.
96. Dostart, supra note 25, at 565.
97. See Rev. Rul. 76-266, 1976-2 C.B. 10.
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Several professional corporations, each with their own pur-
chaser-lessor partnership, might agree to re-lease identical prop-
erty among themselves, only after the original lease had expired.
This ruse appears to meet the literal guidelines of section
46(e) (3), but because it is a mere financing agreement, the credit
might be denied on the grounds it violates congressional intent
behind the statute.
Lease and then Sell to Unrelated Third Party
One alternative that has been suggested is for the lessor to sell
the property to an unrelated third party after initially leasing it.98
However, the same business impracticalities and risks that exist
in the consecutive lease situation plague this choice. In addition,
a sale will most likely result in recapture of some or all of the
credit 99 and recapture of some depreciation,0o but the taxpayer
will have had interest-free use of the recaptured amounts.
Constant employment of this approach will result in denial of
the credit.101 In Massey Motors v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court held that for the purposes of depreciation,'
the "useful life of the asset must be related to the period for
which it may reasonably be expected to be employed in the tax-
payer's business."10 2 The same test is applied for purposes of the
investment credit.103 If a lessor has an established practice of
selling the property prior to the fifty-percent mark, the useful life
will equal the term of the lease. The result is that the term of the
lease is 100% of the useful life. Therefore, if economically feasi-
ble, the lessor should establish no set pattern, but alternate sell-
ing and re-leasing after the initial lease has terminated.10 4 This
would prevent the useful life from being fixed as equal to the
term of the initial lease.
98. Dostart, supra note 25, at 565.
99. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
100. I.R.C. § 1245 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
101. Dostart, supra note 25, at 565.
102. 364 U.S. 92, 107 (1960).
103. I.R.C. § 46(c) (2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
104. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b) (1973), the useful life is computed by
"reference to the taxpayer's experience with similar property taking into account
present conditions and future developments." If the taxpayer's experience proves
to be inadequate, prevailing trade practices provide the standard. Id.
Elect to Pass the Credit Through to the Lessee
As a general rule, the lessor who is unable to meet the require-
ments of section 46(e) (3) can elect to pass the credit through to
the lessee, so that for purposes of the tax credit, the lessee will be
treated as the purchaser.105 However, if a lessor decides he can
satisfy section 46(e) (3) and it is later determined by the IRS or
the courts that he did not, in most cases he has forfeited his right
to pass the credit.106 The property must be new section 38 prop-
erty "in the hands of the lessor" and use of the property must
commence with the lessee. 0 7 Except for short-term lease prop-
ertyl08 and certain corporations, the lessee can claim a credit
based on the fair market value of the property. 09 Where the
property qualifies as short term, only a portion of the credit is
passed through, with the lessor retaining the remainder." 0 Prop-
erty will be characterized as "short term" when its class life ex-
ceeds fourteen years, the term of the lease does not equal or
surpass eighty percent of the class life, and the property is not
transferred under a net lease as defined by I.R.C. section
57(c) (1) (B).n' To effectively pass the credit, the lessor must file
an information statement with the lessee by the "due date... of
the lessee's return for the lessee's taxable year during which pos-
session of the property is transferred to the lessee."" 2 Once
made, the election is irrevocable." 3 Certain events may trigger
recapture.1 1 4
The pass-through is the best option available to the lessor in
the Peterson and Hokanson settings. The advantages from the
105. LR.C. § 48(d) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Even though denied the credit, the
lessor can pass it through because "in this manner, the credit is not denied to the
acquisition itself, but simply to the lessor." H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 30.
106. Dostart, supra note 25, at 563.
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a) (i)-(iii) (1964).
108. I.R.C. § 48(d) (2) (1976).
109. LR.C. § 48(d) (1) (1976 & Supp. 1 1978). Section 48(d) (1) (B) (1976 & Supp.
I 1978) provides that "if the property is leased by a corporation which is a compo-
nent of a controlled group... to another corporation which is a component mem-
ber of the same controlled group," the lessee is to compute the amount of credit
according to the lessor's basis in such property.
110. LR.C. § 48(d) (1) (1976). If the lessor could not qualify under § 46(e) (3), he
would not be entitled to even a part of the credit in the case of short-term
property.
111. LR.C. § 48(d) (4) (1976 & Supp. H 1978); LP&C. § 57(c) (1) (B) (1976) defines a
net lease as a lease which provides that "the lessor is either guaranteed a specific
return or is guaranteed in whole or in part against loss of income."
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(f) (2) (1964).
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(f) (3) (1964).
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(b) (2) (1967). A disposition by the lessor to a person
who could elect to pass the credit or a purchase by the lessee will not trigger re-
capture. Termination of the lease and transfer of the property by the lessee to an-
other party will ignite recapture.
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pass-through may offset the loss of the credit or encouarge lessors
who would qualify for the credit to choose such an election. The
lessor is not limited by the fifty-percent test, but can lease the
property for a longer term. The longer term allows him to mini-
mize the risk that he will fail to recover his investment. In pass-
ing the credit through, the lessor can demand higher rent.
Depending on the lessor's anticipated income and tax bracket, the
amount of rent received may approach or equal the amount of
credit that the lessor would be entitled to claim if he satisfied sec-
tion 46(e) (3). Because the lessee is only treated as the purchaser
for purposes of the investment credit," 5 the lessor can still take
deductions for depreciation,"n6 interest payments," 7 and property
taxes."l8
The advantage of claiming these deductions on an individual
level provides a substantial incentive for a corporation to form a
purchaser-lessor partnership that will pass the credit through.
Whether the courts would allow the credit in this situation is
questionable. Congress said that "the credit is not denied to the
acquisition itself, but simply to the lessor."" 9 Yet Congress also
sought to prevent leasing transactions motivated solely to gain
tax benefits, that is, credit, depreciation, and interest deduc-
tions.120 The courts would probably allow the credit because
when the credit is passed through to the corporation, Congress'
major concern that the credit will be used to shelter individual in-
come is not realized.
Elect Subchapter S Status
In Peterson and similar situations where a partnership owned
entirely by a corporation is created or maintained solely to pro-
cure the credit, election of Subchapter S status by the corporation
permits the credit to be obtained on an individual level. Because
a Subchapter S corporation is taxed similarly to a partnership,
the credit, if claimed by the corporation, will pass directly to the
shareholders.121 The corporation in Peterson could dissolve the
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a) (i) (1964).
116. LR.C. § 167 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
117. IR.C. § 163 (1976).
118. I.R.C. § 164 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
119. See supra note 105.
120. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
121. See 6 FED. TAxEs (P-H) 1 33,362 (1982).
partnership, elect Subchapter S status, and purchase the equip-
ment directly. Not only would the credit pass directly to the
shareholders, but so would any deductions that the purchaser and
owner of the property would be entitled to take-depreciation, in-
terest payments, and property taxes. 22
In the Hokanson situation, where an individual or partnership
is leasing property for legitimate business reasons, election to
Subchapter S status by the lessor offers no assistance. Because a
Subchapter S corporation is considered a person for purposes of
section 46(e) (3), it is subject to the same limitations as a
noncorporate lessor. 23 The lessor, however, might be able to per-
suade the corporate lessee to elect Subchapter S status by prom-
ising to pass the credit through. The lessor could then charge
higher rent because the corporation's shareholders would be prof-
iting more than if their company had remained an ordinary
corporation.
Selection of this option will depend on whether the require-
ments for election124 of this status can be fulfilled and whether it
is practical in a business sense. 2 5 The Subchapter S Revision
Act of 1982 has made election more appealing for several rea-
sons:126 election and maintenance of status has become easier;
corporation losses can now be deducted by the individual share-
holder to the extent of his basis in stock and in debt owed him by
the corporation; 2 7 and unused losses can be carried over until
there is a sufficient basis against which to offset them. 28
The individual shareholder must be wary that his stock interest
in the corporation does not fall too far below what it was when
Subchapter S status was elected, or recapture of the credit will be
122. Id.
123. LR.C. § 46(e) (3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
124. L&C. § 1371(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A corporation can qualify for Sub-
chapter S status if it is a "domestic corporation which is not a member of an affili-
ated group (as defined in section 1504) and which does not-
1) have more than 35 shareholders;
2) have as a shareholder a person... who is not an individual;
3) have a nonresident alien as a shareholder; and
4) have more than one class of stock."
Id. (the number of shareholders was increased from 25 to 35 by the Subchapter S
Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669) (LR.C. § 1371(a) to be
recodifled as I.R.C. § 1361(a)).
125. See 6 FED. TAXEs, supra note 121, at 33,665-68. Several factors will deter-
mine whether an election should be made: "the pattern of expected distributions,
the shareholder's need for use of the income, and the respective tax brackets." Id.
at 33,666.
126. A CoNciSE EXPLANATION OF THE SUBcEAPTER S REVISION AcT OF 1982, 20
TAx IDEAS REPORT BuLLETIN (P-H) 2 (1982).
127. Id.
128. Id.
[VOL. 20: 917, 1983] Comment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
triggered.12 9 Shareholders need not worry that the IRS or courts
will refuse to recognize an election because it was chosen solely
for tax reasons; both agree that such reasons are consistent with
congressional intent. 30
Enter Into a Management Contract
By entering into a management contract instead of a leasing
agreement, the purchaser of "section 38 property" can procure the
credit and avoid the noncorporate lessor limitations. The entity
or individual using the property is considered the agent of the
property owner. Two factors are needed for an agreement to be
characterized as a management contract. The property owner
must exercise a degree of control over the operation involving the
property, and he must bear the risk of loss if the venture proves
unprofitable.131
The tax planner will want to insert various provisions into the
agreement that shift the risk of loss to the owner. Such provi-
sions will require the property owner to pay for all expenses in-
curred by the agent and any damage to the property,132 to
indemnify the agent for all claims arising out of the operation of
the property, 33 and to contribute to the agent's losses. 34 Rent
could be fixed as a percentage of the venture's net profits, 3 5 or
losses sustained in one year could be carried over to following
years to reduce payments to the owner.136
It is not entirely clear what will suffice as adequate control. A
recent Tax Court decision, Meagher v. Commissioner,137 indicates
that a minimal amount of control will satisfy the test.1 38 The
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.47-4(a) (2) (1967). If the shareholder's ownership interest
falls below 66 2/3% of his original interest, recapture of an amount that is propor-
tionate to the reduction in stock interest will occur. No further recapture will take
place, unless his interest then falls below 33%. Id.
130. Modem Home Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 839, 851-
53 (1970); Rev. Rul 76-363, 1976-2 C.B. 90-91.
131. McNabb v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 86,156, 86,157 (W.D.
Wash. 1980); Meagher v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1091, 1093 (1977).
132. Meagher v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1094.
133. Id.
134. University Hill Found. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 548, 568 (1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
135. State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. United States, 509 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir.
1975).
136. University Hill Found. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. at 569.
137. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1091 (1977).
138. See Dostart, supra note 25, at 563.
court found the necessary control in the various obligations im-
posed on the user of the property. The user had to keep records
of the equipment's operation, use best efforts to lease the prop-
erty, obtain insurance naming the property owner as a co-benefi-
ciary, and pay net profits over to the owner within a certain
time.13 9 The court conceded that the owner lacked any direct con-
trol over the user's leasing activities with regard to his
property.14o
In a similar case, McNabb v. United States,141 the court held the
agreement to be a lease, in part because the property owner had
no control over the user's leasing activities. It dismissed the
value of operational reports provided to the owner by the user be-
cause the owner lacked the authority to utilize the information to
affect the user's leasing activities. 4 2
Where the lessor and lessee are under common control, a man-
agement contract appears to be an effective device for avoiding
the noncorporate lessor limitations. In Peterson, because the doc-
tors control both the partnership and the corporation, it matters
little that the partnership, as opposed to the corporation, assumes
the risk of loss, or that the partnership exercises some control
over the corporation's activities. Again, it must be emphasized
that if the only motive is tax avoidance, the court may refuse to
permit the credit.
If the parties are unrelated, both parties may be reluctant to
structure a transaction as a management contract. For a small
businessman like Hokanson, the potential economic disaster that
awaits him if he bears the risk of loss is a powerful deterrent. It
is very questionable whether a lending institution would loan Ho-
kanson the funds to purchase the trucks if he assumed this risk-
because Hokanson is a small businessman, any loss he might
have to absorb might prevent him from paying off the loan.
The willingness of the "agent" to permit the property owner a
degree of control over the agent's activities will turn on which
case-Meagher or McNabb-the courts follow. If Meagher is fol-
lowed, an organization like Nor-Pac might well consent to such an
arrangement because the requisite degree of control exercised by
Hokanson would not fetter Nor-Pac's freedom to make major
business decisions. In contrast, if the test in McNabb is adopted,
it is extremely unlikely that Nor-Pac would agree to permit a
139. Meagher v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.I. (CCH) 1094 (1977).
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mere supplier of transportation significant control over its busi-
ness activities.
Enter Into a Service Contract
The restrictions of section 46(e) (3), which only apply to leases,
can be avoided altogether by providing "section 38 property" as
an integral part of a service. 43 Certain express provisions in the
agreement will be accepted as indicative of a service contract: re-
tention of ownership by the taxpayer; risk of loss placed on the
taxpayer if the machine is damaged or inoperative; inability of
customers to alter, repair, or move the property without the tax-
payer's permission; and responsibility of the taxpayer to main-
tain, repair, or replace the equipment and train the customer's
personnel.'"
Until Xerox v. United States,145 the IRS had distinguished be-
tween leases and service contracts in tax credit situations. In
Xerox, the United States Court of Claims rejected the IRS' con-
tention that the agreement constituted a lease. 4 6 Because it is
uncertain whether the Commissioner will acquiesce in the deci-
sion, the taxpayer needs to be aware of the points of conflict be-
tween the IRS and the Court of Claims, especially because the
IRS will first be exposed to the agreement.
Both agree that the party providing the service must retain con-
trol and possession of the property. 47 To retain possession, the
IRS has indicated that the owner must exercise actual physical
control over the property, unless placement with the recipient of
the services is inherent in such a transaction.148 In Xerox, the
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court was satisfied that the taxpayer retained possession because
the government could not deny the corporation access to the ma-
chines. 149 A sound policy justification for rejection of the IRS'
definition is that it discriminates against the property owner
whose property is of such a nature that he cannot remove it daily
from the other party's premises. The court also refused to recog-
nize the IRS' distinction between the property owner providing
services and the customer providing services for himself. Such a
distinction would be too difficult and "cryptic" to make.150
In addition, other factors, heretofore not recognized as impor-
tant by the IRS, were cited as crucial by the court. The court at-
tached great significance to the provision in the lease requiring an
inoperative or inefficient machine to be replaced by a properly
functioning machine.'-9 The policy of "insuring a working
machine rather than keeping a machine in working order" indi-
cates a service rather than a lease, because a lease generally im-
plicates a particular item of property.15 2 Finally, the court found
two aspects of payment important. The owner was paid according
to the number of copies produced, rather than a fixed monthly
rental.15 3 This suggests a service contract, because the customer
was not paying for the use of the machine, but for the end prod-
uct.15 4 The court also emphasized that remuneration was not de-
termined by the value of the machines but was based in large
part on the various obligations and risks assumed by the
owner.1 55
Both the United States District Court and the Tax Court are
also available forums for tax disputes, and the holding of the
United States Court of Claims is not binding on these tribunals.
It may therefore be necessary that the taxpayer satisfy the IRS
criteria in the event these other courts adopt the IRS position. By
providing truck drivers, for example, Hokanson could easily sat-
149. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d at 675.
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switchboard and in Letter Ruling 7829066 (1978) patients had to operate televisions
placed in a hospital. The IRS held that the taxpayers were providing a service.
When the test by its very nature is so vague and ambiguous that it cannot be ap-
plied without producing inconsistent results, it is appropriate to retire it. If the
copy machines in Rev. Rul. 71-397 had become inoperative, the customer clearly
could not provide services for himself until the owner had corrected the problem.
Xerox Corp. v. United States, 656 F.2d at 676 n.26.
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isfy the requirement that the owner provide the services, rather
than the customer providing a service for himself. Hokanson
could meet the possession requirement, which demands that Ho-
kanson exercise actual physical control over the trucks, by storing
the trucks when not in use on property owned or rented by him.
However, this storage cost would be reflected in the service
charge and might deter the customer from entering into a service
agreement. The customer, if he already possessed the space to
house the trucks, presumably would pay less if he leased the
trucks and provided his own drivers than if he had to pay a serv-
ice charge, because such a charge would include storage costs.
If the Xerox criteria controls, the "small-time" lessor, as por-
trayed by Hokanson, who may lease to only one customer or
whose operation is quite limited financially, may be deterred from
entering into such a service agreement by two requirements.
First, because the parties are unrelated, the property owner may
not be willing or able to bear the risk of loss if his machine fails to
produce as promised. (Even if a lease is entered into, the lessor
may have to assume this risk.) Second, the owner with limited
resources may not be able to afford to keep extra machines in
stock to replace faulty models. The court in Xerox found such
like-kind exchanges crucial to its holding.156
In the Peterson situation, assuming the IRS test controlled, the
partnership would most likely fail both the possession and provid-
ing services tests. It would be highly impractical or costly to re-
move medical equipment, computers, or typewriters when the
workday was completed or to provide personnel to operate the
equipment. If compliance with the Xerox decision is required, as-
sumption of the risk by the partnership, the owner of the property
in question, would not be a source of concern because both the
partnership and corporation are owned by the doctors. However,
the problem of keeping extra machines in stock to replace ineffi-
cient or broken down models still remains.
Also present in the Peterson situation, where the only motive in
providing a service would be to obtain the credit as an individual,
is the danger that the court will invoke Gregory v. Helvering to
deny the credit. However, the Tax Court recently considered
whether a taxpayer was providing an air transport service or
whether he was leasing planes to a corporation of which he
156. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
owned ninety-two percent.157 The taxpayer claimed he was pro-
viding a service presumably because section 46(e) (3) would pre-
clude him from taking the credit if the agreement constituted a
lease. The court held the agreement to be a lease,158 but it never
questioned the proposition that the taxpayer would be entitled to
the credit if the agreement was a service contract, even though
his only apparent motive in structuring it as a service contract
would be to obtain the credit.
CONCLUSION
Peterson and Hokanson have made one point emphatically
clear- the noncorporate lessor restrictions now present a formida-
ble obstacle to qualifying for the credit. The court acted consist-
ently with congressional intent in Peterson because this was
exactly the practice Congress had tried to legislate against. Ho-
kanson should be reconsidered; it is difficult to imagine what fur-
ther steps the parties could have taken to satisfy the "realistically
contemplated" test. Also, the lessor was a member of the class
Congress had designed the credit to benefit. Alternatives remain
open to a purchaser of "section 38 property" to avoid the restric-
tions and qualify for the credit on an individual level. The enthu-
siasm of the purchaser to embrace these alternatives may be
tempered by business practicalities and the willingness of the
courts to look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance.
A new chapter in creative tax planning has commenced.
TIM KOLTUN
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